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TREACHERY AND BETRAYAL- AN ANALYSIS OF THE MODERN FIDUCIARY 
BEHAVIOR OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS AND MANAGEMENT- THE NEED FOR 
SCHOOLING IN THE BUSINESS ETHICS OF TOMORROW 
Gregory H uckabee, Un ivers ity of South Dakota 
This article examines the fiduciary relationship between corporate officers and directors, and the 
shareholders they serve. in recent years, the breakdown of the fiduciary relationship and the failure of the 
corporate model have received much attention, as the headlines of Wall Street's endless fiduciary scandals 
adequately illustrate. What is the root of this failure, and what, if anything, are the remedies? Case 
analysis will demonstrate the pandemic problem involving fiduciary responsibility, demonstrating the need 
for reform. This review will identify systemic corporate fiduciary weaknesses and underlying causes. 
Recommendations for change to alleviate fiduciary fa ilure will be discussed, with focus placed on ethics 
and need for revitalized instruction. 
INTRODUCTION 
Wl1en Mickey confTonted Minnie about an eye 
popping $ 140 mi ll ion debit in their checking account, 
Minnie told him to ta lk to their fiduciary, Mr. Michael 
Eisner, who all egedly was minding the Magic Kingdom 's 
finances. Wl1en Mr. Eisner, CEO for the Di sney empire, 
wou ld not return Mickey ' repeated phone ca ll s, Mickey 
and severa l of hi s shareholder fri ends fi led a deri vative 
shareholder suit aga inst Eisner and hi s board of directors. 
In vesti ga tion di sclosed that all was not we ll in the Magi c 
Kingdom, and Mickey 's most tru ted business partner 
may have been doing everything, but ac ting in hi s and 
Minnie ' s best interest. 
Walt Di ney 's board of directors, together with Mr. 
Eisner, were defendants in a civil acti on in a Delaware 
trial al leging they breached their fiduciary duties when 
they blindl y approved an empl oyment agreement with 
Michael Ovitz , making him president of the Walt Disney 
Company. Furthermore, it was all eged that a litt le more 
than a year later, and aga in withou t any review or 
de liberati on, the board of direc tor took no act ion when 
Mr. Eisner entered into a non-fault termi nation agreement 
wherein Mr. Ovi tz received $ 140 million from Mi ckey 
and Minnie 's bank acco unt. also J.:-no,vn as. the corpora te 
colTers. The de ri vati ve shareholder suit acc used Di sney's 
fiduciarie of failing to exerci se any business judgment, 
and of failin g to make a good faith attempt to fu lfil l their 
fiduciary obli ga ti ons to Di sney and its stockholders (In re 
Wa lt Di ney Co. Deri va ti ve Liti g., 2003). 
Facts 
When Eisner's second-in -command died 111 a 
heli copter crash, Eisner sought to replace hi m with a 
personal fTiend of twenty-five years, Michael Ovitz. 
Wl1i le Ovitz's previous business experience consisted of 
ervice as the founder and head of a ta lent agency, he had 
never been employed as an executi ve in any publicly 
owned enterta inment enterpri e. Undaunted, Eisner 
dec ided unil erally to hire Ovitz, informing three 
members of Disney 's board of direc tors on August 13, 
1995. Even though all three directors protested the hiring, 
they took no action. The fo ll owin g day Eisner sent Ovitz 
a lett er settin g out the mate rial terms of hi s prospective 
contTac t as president of Disney. Prior to thi s, as the record 
ren ects, neither the board of directors nor its 
compensation committee ever di scus ed hiring Ovitz for 
anything, let alone president of the company. 
After a draft empl yment contract surfaced , the 
compensation committee fin all y met to di scuss the Ovitz 
propositi on. Surpri s ingly, no copy of the draft 
empl oyment agreement was submitted to the committee. 
Instead , they received a rough summary of the agreement. 
No spreadsheet or any ana lytica l document showing the 
potential compensation package to Ovitz, or the poss ible 
cost of hi s severance package, was ever presented to the 
committee . Nor did the committee request any 
information or perfom1 an in vestigation as to how thi s 
package compared with similar ones in the industry. 
After a shon di scussion, the committee adopted a 
resolution approvin g the contract. 
Three days later the fu ll board of directors met and 
approved the resolu tion hiring Ovitz. There were no 
documents, let alone a draft contrac t, submitted to the 
boa rd lo r its consideration , nor did it ask for any. Wl1ile 
Ovitz offi cia ll y started serving as Disney 's president on 
October I, 1995, hi emp loyment agreement was not 
executed until December 12, 1995 . However, the 
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effective date of the employment agreement was 
backdated to October 1 when he began his duties. 
The final agreement di ffered substantially from the 
earlier drafts (none of which had been reviewed by the 
board or its compensation committee). The fmal 
employment contract and stock option plan granted Ovitz 
one million Disney shares for each of the three years of 
his employment contract. Furthermore, the stock 
agreement (signed on December 12, 1995) authori zed an 
option price dating back to October 16, 1995 , when a 
Disney share stood at $56.87. By December 12th it had 
risen eight percent to $6 1.50, making Ovitz a wea lthy 
Mousekateer overnight. 
If this seemed too generous by industry standards, 
Ovitz 's contract contained a non-fault termination 
provision, wherein as long as he did not act with gross 
negligence or malfeasance, he would receive the full 
benefits of his contract. This included immediate vesting 
of his three years of stock options totaling three million 
shares, even if Ovitz acted ordinarily negligent or proved 
unable to perform hi s duties. In addition , Ovitz would 
receive the remainder of his annual salary, and a $7.5 
million bonus for each year remaining on his contract, 
even though Disney was not obli gated to pay an annual 
bonus. Finally, he was to receive a lump sum tern1ination 
payment of $10 mi Ilion. The tota I package rang up on the 
register at $140 million. Paying someone this much 
money to leave the company irrespective of perforn1ance, 
caught the attention of many shareholders once the good 
news gone badly leaked out. 
Ovitz 's presidency proved unhappy from the start. 
Ovitz was not accustomed to being second-i n-command . 
Soon Mr. Eisner and Mr. Ovitz reali zed the work 
arrangement was not a good "fit. " Instead of focusing on 
learning his new job, Mr. Ovitz admitted he spent time 
looking for alternative employment. If Ovitz had been 
required to resign outright, Disney would not have had to 
pay him the severance non-fault tern1ination clause 
package . Instead of choosing this option, however, Eisner 
discussed exercising the non-fault termination clause of 
Ovitz's contract with him, and not surpri singl y, O vi tz 
jumped at it. On December 12, 1996, Ovitz's ex it from 
Disney became public, and with onl y a year on the job, 
Ovitz and hi s non-termination c lause package le ft 
Burbank, Californi a. Like hi s employment offer, neither 
the board of directors nor the compensation committee 
were consulted on the exerci se of thi s mega million deal. 
Furthermore, no record exi sts of any board acti on after 
the non-fault tem1ination became publi c on December 12, 
1996. 
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Fo ll owing a full trial on the merits and an evaluation 
of the extent to which each officer and director fulfilled 
their fiduciary duties; the court emphasized the 
importance of the business judgn1ent rule and found that 
all of the defendants were, on the facts , entitled to a 
presumption of acting in good faith . The court held that 
acting in good faith was key to a fiduciary ' s duties, 
including the duty of care. The court subsequently set the 
standard for finding bad faith very high, maintaining: 
A fai lure to act in good faith [may be found] 
. . . where the fiduci ary intentionally acts with 
the purpose other than that of advancing the 
best interests o f the company, where the 
fiduciary acts with the intent to violate 
applicable positi ve law, or where the fiduciary 
intentionally fail s to act in the face of a known 
duty to act, demonstrating a conscious di sregard 
o f hi s duti es (In re Walt D isney, 2005 : 15452) . 
A findin g by the court that the directors had exercised 
bad faith would have deprived the directors of the 
persona l liability protection/immuni ty provided by the 
business judgment rule. The court repeatedly admonished 
Disney 's directors for failing to live up to the ideals of 
corporate governance, and from an aspirational level of 
responsibility, the directors should have been more 
dili gent in carrying out their duti es. Nevertheless, the 
court found that the board 's fai lure to meet these 
standards did not demonstrate actionabl e bad fai th . 
Perhaps because De laware is the home of corporate 
Ameri ca, courts within the state tend to be reluctant to 
open a Pandora ' s Box o f fiduciary deri vative liability 
suits by lowering the bad fa ith or its equivalency bar. 
Upset M ice 
So why would the multitudes of shareholder mice in 
the Magic Kingdom be di straught over thi s state of 
affa irs? The concern mi ght involve the business 
obligation we call " fi duciary du ty." Di sney shareholders 
have an ex pec tation interest that their enterta inn1ent 
business would be managed by a board of direc tors who 
would exercise the "utmost care" whil e di scharging their 
fiduc iary duti es. A fid uc iary, by defi nition is a special 
person in a confi denti al re lationship who owes a lega l 
duty of trust. loya lty, and confidence to another. ln thi s 
case, the corporate o ffi cers and the board of d irectors owe 
thi s lega l du ty to Di sney's shareholders (Mann , 2004). 
A corporate offi cer or direc tor who vio lates a 
fiduciary duty may be liabl e for losses incurred through 
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its breach. A famous jurist named Justi ce Benjamin 
Cardozo characteri zed the fiduc iary relationship in 1928 
in Meinhard v. Sa lmon as what one owe[s] to one 
another, while the enterpri se conti nues, the duty of fi nest 
loya lty . . . A tTustee is he ld to something stTicter than the 
mora ls of the market pl ace . Not honesty alone, but the 
punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the 
standard of behavior" ( 1928: 546) . 
How does that standard template onto D isney's 
corporate fiduciary-directo rs? We will return to thi s later. 
But first, is thi s a serious problem worthy of further study 
across the corporate ki ngdoms of today, or is Mickey 's 
case an aberration, unique and limi ted to a few bi g dollar 
magicians? The foc us of thi s work wi ll address the issues 
of what and how to teach ethics, with the case studies 
provid ing justifi cation for this need . 
Contagion- Treachery and Betrayal on an Apocalyptic 
Scale 
Public citi zen advocate Ra lph N ader argues American 
corporations are the most pern icious forms of business 
organiza tions today, wh ich explo it in vestors, consumers, 
and workers in our ociety, beyond anyth ing seen before 
i.n American hjsto ry . Wi th thi s as background, i Disney 's 
(a Fortune 500 company) recent apparent fiduciary 
breac h an aberration, or a symptom of a far more serious 
corporate leadership problem? The sc ion of busi ness 
economics, Adam Smith, in hi s "Wea lth of Nations" 
presc iently observed, (t]he d irectors of companies, 
however, be ing the managers of other peop le's money 
than the ir own, it cannot be expec ted that they should 
watch over it with the same anx ious vig il ance las owners] 
.... Neg ligence and profusion, therefore, must always 
preva il , more or less, in the management of the affa irs of 
such a company ( 1880: 326) . 
If past is prologue, shou ld we be surp ri sed to learn 
be tween 1998 and January 2002, that Gary Win ni ck, 
fou nder and cha innan of G lobal Cross ing, o ld $734 
mi lli on in stock whil e hi s company filed for banhuptcy 
protect ion on January 28, 2002, the fourth largest 
bankruptcy in corporate hi story? In 2005 , Tyco 's CEO 
Denn is Kozlowski was fo und gui lty of 22 counts o f grand 
larceny, conspiracy, fa lsify in g busines records, and 
violating businc ·s law involvin g mass ive fraud - looting 
$600 mill ion from hi s co mpany. Toge ther with his C FO 
Mark Schwart.G, he was sentenced from 8 to 25 yea rs in 
pri son , and o rdered to repay Tyco $ 134 mi ll ion (N Y 
T imes. 2005) . In add ition, Kozlowski wa fi ned $70 
m ill ion and Schwa1 z $34 milli on. ln June 2002 , 
Ade lphia Commu nica tions fi led for bankruptcy as it tried 
Joumal o f Busi ness and Leadership : Research, Practi ce, and Teaching 
to deal with over $20 billion in debt, ongoing losses, and 
accusations o f self-dealing by the founding family 
(Gerena-Morales, 2003). CEO fiduciary John Rigas 
subsequently was sentenced to 15 years in prison for 
similar mi sconduct (Farzad , 2005) . 
Should it di sturb shareholders that 208 executives and 
directors from the 25 largest U.S . companies that filed for 
bankruptcy between January 200 I and July 2002 made 
off with gross earnings of $3.3 billion, most of it realized 
from stock sold before the company collapsed (Cheng, 
2002)? How should the investor feel about executives and 
directors of I ,035 corporations, whose stock fell at least 
75 percent from the highs they achieved just before 2001 , 
cashing out with $66 billion (G imein, 2002)? If there is 
any remain ing doubt about greed, at the 25 corporations 
where executives cashed out the most before their 
scandals broke, no one now would likely be surprised to 
learn 466 insiders carri ed off a haul of $23 billion . One 
mi ght sti ll ask: where were the ir fell ow corporate officers 
and boards of d irectors while a ll thi s miscreant activity 
was occurri ng? 
Speaking of corporate offi cers, the Enron leadership 
team tal s the boldness prize for its $680 million 
with rawal of corporate equ ity. CEO Ken Lay pocketed 
$67 milli on in compensation during the year prior to its 
bankruptcy, Jeffrey Skilling, pres ident, rifl ed $40 million, 
and CFO Andrew Fastow (who has since pl ed guilty to 
fraud , receiving 6 years impri sonment that he is currently 
serving) made away with a mere $5.6 million. But the 
breath taker is the di scovery that 140 Enron executi ves 
receiving a total o f $680 milli on, averaging $4.7 million 
apiece, for the ir fid uciary per fo rmance o f loyalty, and 
honest effoti s on behalf of the ir shareholders. Not to be 
outdone, WorldCom's Bern ie Ebbers made o ff with $3 60 
mi ll ion in persona l loan guarantees, whil e Qwest' s CEO 
Joe Nacchio received a $20 milli on severance package 
after lo ing $ 100 b illi on in shareholder va lue (G imein, 
2002). 
Speaking o f CEOs' sen e of fiduc iary fidelity, 
D isney 's very own Michae l E isner mysteriously saw hi s 
annual compensation ri se 498% to $6 million in 2002 
while shareholder return fell 18%. Leo F. Mullin, Delta ' s 
CEO, rece ived $ 13 .8 million, a 104% increase over the 
previous yea r, while asking the pilots union to take a 
reduction in previously negoti ated wages, concurrent 
with a shareholder loss in equity that plummeted 58%. 
Miles D. Whi te, CEO at Abbott Labs, received 
$25,545,490 in 2002, a meager 147% increase amidst a 
shareholder decrease of 27% i.n stock price. Even 
depatii ng ll oneywe ll CEO Lawrence Bossidy received a 
fa rewe ll bonus o f $4 million while stockho lders 
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experienced a share loss of 27% in 2002 (Nader, 2003). 
So the question remains : who is minding the store for 
their shareholders while all these equi ty withdrawals are 
taking place? Apparently these corporations are bereft of 
leaders who do not understand the ethical and fisca l 
defmition of the term " fiduciary. " Do these facts reveal 
an exercise of "utmost good faith" on behalf of their 
stockholders, or attest to a serious conflict of interest? 
HealthSouth ' s founder Richard Scrushy was accused 
of even more outlandish leadership, facing 85 coun ts of 
criminal behavior stemming from a $2.7 billion fraud he 
was accused of perpetrating invol ving hi s own interest. 
Federal prosecutors are sought forfeiture of $279 mi llion 
in property including two luxury homes, two private 
airplanes, a 92-foot yacht, a fl eet of luxury cars includ ing 
a Lamborghini and Rolls Royce, and paintings by 
Picasso, Chagall , and Renoir (Whitmire, 2005). Samuel 
Waksal , former ImCione CEO, and tipster to one Martha 
Stewart who served her own j ail time, even pled gu il ty to 
insider trading during his equity withdrawals involving 
stock options (Breeden, 2003). How many CEOs and 
CFOs does it take to constitute a pattern? 
Round Up the Usual Suspects 
The hit 1987 movie "Wall Street" portrayed business 
greed at its worst in the character of Gordon Gekko 
(played by Michael Douglas in an Oscar-winning 
performance). Gekko was "an investor" focused on only 
one business topic - greed - that he imparted passionately 
at a shareholders meeting where he attempted a company 
takeover. While one may rationali ze the executive 
fiduciary behavior addressed above as a seductive 
endorsement of "Wall Street' s" Gordon Gekko mantra 
"greed is good for America" (hi s stated purpose at the 
shareholders meeting), there may be at least one other 
equally plausible explanation . For investors, says senior 
vice president and special counsel at Insti tutional 
Shareholder Services Patrick McGurn, "poor governance 
is a substantial ri sk factor" (Bums, 2003) . Dow Jones 
Newswires in Washington reporter Judi th Bums sums it 
up observing. When it works as it's supposed to, a board 
of directors looks attenti vely over the shoulders of 
executives who smartly handl e the day-to-day busi ness 
decisions, and the shareholders get a fu ll accountin g of 
the company ' s operations and fin ances. But lately, this 
model has failed in some rather spectacul ar smash-ups, 
with executives acting like imperia l monarchs - operati ng 
unchecked by boards, bankrupting their companies and 
leaving shareholders with nearl y worthl ess stock (Burns, 
2003). 
Jouma l of 13usiness and Leadership: Research, Practice, and Teachin g 
Could corporate model fai lure be the root cause fo r 
thi s outbreak of corporate Gekkoism? If so, why is the 
model breaking down now? A joint study by the Institute 
for Policy Studies in Washington and the Boston-based 
independent research group United for a Fa iT Economy 
report on average CEO pay rose 279% from 1990 to 
2002, exceeding the 166% ri se in the Standard & Poor' s 
500-stock index over the same period. CEO salaries are 
determined by board of directors' compensation 
committees . The Wall Street Journal reports that in too 
many cases today, board members have been hand picked 
by the very parties they are supposed to oversee, the chief 
executives. "Often in such cases, the boards approve 
whatever the CEOs ask for- particularly big pay 
packages that aren ' t tied to performance" (Bums, 2003). 
How true is this? During 2002 "CEOs of the 350 
biggest U.S. compani es enj oyed a 7% rise in their pay, 
despi te an average 13% fa ll in corporate profitability 
during the year" (Conference Board, 2002). Should 
shareholders be concerned? As one bl unt investment 
manager observed in a CATO Institute report on thi s 
subject, "[E]nron ain ' t the problem . . . The unremarked gut 
issue today is that over the past decade there was a 
landslide transfer of wealth from public shareholders to 
corporate managers. Enron was just the tip of the iceberg 
ready to happen" (Niskanan, 2002). 
Should shareholders really be concerned about paying 
140 company executives in one company $680 million? 
After all , it is their money, and are we not ta lking about 
the "C" word here- corruption? One key symptom of 
corporate corruption, in fact, is runaway CEO pay. 
During the past decade, CEO pay has grown from 42 
times average employee pay to 531 times average 
employee pay. Comparing other industrialized nations, 
Japanese CEOs make only 20 times what an average 
·vorker earns, while Briti sh CEOs make 35 times, a far 
cry from their colonial cousins (Conference Board, 
2002) . Even management by objectives guru Dr. Peter F. 
Drucker forewarned the increasing pay gap between 
CEOs and employees in the early 1980 ' s. He observed 
that such di sparity tmeatens the credibility of corporate 
leadership, mai ntaining that no leader should earn more 
than 20 ti mes the company' s lowest pa id employee. 
Conundrum 
So if corporate executive greed, COITuption , and 
fiduciary duty breaches are being caused by lack of 
accountability on the part of boards of directors, hand-
pi cked by the same CEOs, CFOs, and officers they are 
supposed to po lice, how can the cyc le be broken'7 One 
3 19 4
Journal of Business & Leadership: Research, Practice, and Teaching (2005-2012), Vol. 2 [2006], No. 2, Art. 11
http://scholars.fhsu.edu/jbl/vol2/iss2/11
Huckabee 
obvious solution is to "buck up or develop fiduciaries 
with an attitude" to serve on the boards of directors. A 
2002 study by consultants McKinsey & Co. defmed 
"good corporate governance as having a board with a 
majority of outsiders who are truly independent of the 
company and its managers, who have significant holdings 
of the company's stock, and who are paid chiefly in 
company stock or its equivalent." In addition, "[f]ormal 
evaluation of directors and responsiveness to investor 
requests for information are other hallmarks of well-
governed companies," claiming McKinsey (Burns, 2003). 
But how can the control of CEOs over selection of 
board of director members be avoided? A panel of the 
Conference Board, a business research group in New 
York, recommended a number of changes to improve 
corporate governance. Among the changes, they 
recommended "[a ]t the top of the list: splitting the role of 
chairman of the board from that of chief executive-
preferably with the chairman's position filled by an 
independent director. Chairmen have far more than a 
ceremonial role, as they set board agendas, manage 
meetings and control the flow of information to the 
board." McKinsey ' s research reflects that separation of 
the CEO and chairman function s is the norm in Great 
Britain . Their recent survey of Fortune 500 companies 
found that 70% of directors favored splitting the two 
roles. A Corporate L ibrary official reports about one-third 
of U.S. companies have already divided the roles (Burns, 
2003). 
Separation of duties may not be sufficient. Besides 
counteracting the "Gekko greed" factor, is there a more 
deep-seated training or education deficiency that deters 
corporate leadership from embracing their fiduciary 
duties? Fonner Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Yolcker 
observed, "I was struck not too long ago when a leading 
figure on Wall Street sa id to me, ' What do you expect 
when for 20 or 30 years al l our best business schools 
have been teaching the ideology that the stock price is the 
only thing that counts.' And it wasn ' t to stretch the 
corollary far to say anything you can do to get the stock 
price up is appropriate" (Wall Street Letter, 2003) . 
If our best business schoo ls are teach ing ' that the 
stock price is the only thing that counts and that anything 
you can do to get it up is appropriate ' behavior, then it is 
not hard to see why the fiduc iary duty has become a burnt 
o ffering on the altar of stock prices. When sorporate 
executi ves like Di sney's Eisner and Ovitz receive 
millions of stock options, is there a relationship involving 
Yolcker ' s observation , corporate executi ve self-dealing, 
and subsequent fiduciary mi sconduct? When comparing 
thi s with the exec utive corruption and billions in 
Journal of Business and Leadership : Research, Practice, and Teaching 
shareholder wealth transfers di scussed above, the culprit 
may be those on the professorial platforms as much as the 
pupils they taught so well (Bus iness Week, 2003). A 2003 
survey of 2,700 Business Week readers discovered that 
over half (53%) of the responders believe that present 
business schools do not perform a good job of grounding 
their graduates in ethical business practices. This same 
survey found that 63% believed that most executives in 
corporate America are " law-abiding citizens, who 
sometimes place profits above morals." An additional 
28% said these same executives "would do just about 
anything fo r a dollar" (Business Week Online, Jan. 17, 
2003). 
A year later, a 2004 Wall Street Journal poll asked 
"How much emphasis should MBA programs place on 
business ethics?" Thi s on line poll revealed that 81% 
(1466 responders) indicated that "ethics courses should 
be required of all students" (Weber, 2006). 
Fix 
The billions shareholders lost, the collapse of the 
stock market in July 2002 (losing 1500 points in four 
weeks on r ) Orts of mounting corporate fiduciary 
scandals). and the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
in January 2002 , all reflect a mass ive lack of confidence 
by the American people in the integrity and execution of 
corporate fiduciary responsibilities by business leaders 
today. Frustrated with out-of-control and irresponsible 
CEOs and boards of directors, Congress enacted a 
co ll ective ethic of accountabi li ty in Sarbanes-Oxley 
imposing new and costl y procedures to stem thi s 
behavior. 
What would the late Wa lt Di sney say about all this? 
He mi ght say that it is time to go back to school to re-
learn the basics. Somehow academia has foc used on the 
means of corporate American business whi le losing sight 
of its goal - service to the consumer, the investors, the 
employees, and the economy as the engine of democracy 
(Khurana , 2004). 
Can ethics be taught or is it inherent or intuitive? 
Business basics have tradi ti onall y included business 
ethics, that is - the moral compass of who you are in the 
dark when no one else is watching; that which guides 
your dec ision-making when determining right from 
wrong business dec isions (Weber, 2006). When 
review ing our respec ti ve business curricula, what place 
and rol e do ethics play? Whose ethics are we teaching, or 
more importantl y, should we be teaching? Should it be 
Gordon Gekko 's relativi sm - that individuals judge for 
themselves what is ri ght and wrong exclusive of external 
considerati ons, or utilitarianism -holding that the course 
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of action seeking the greatest good for the most people is 
the appropriate ethical approach, or should it be Kantian 
duty-based standards of conduct that maintain the 
proposed action is ethical if everyone could universally 
exercise it? 
At this moment in business hi story, thi s is the most 
important subject we should be di scussing, debating, and 
forming a united academic consensus on . This consensus 
should be for the purpose of changing the direction that 
has brought so much fiduciary disservice to our 
profession, the economy, and our people. The most 
successful companies historically appear to be those 
characterizing their most treasured value as being 
"service." Profit is without question an indi spensable 
component or reward to business service, but our 
teaching error has led to the displacement of the "service" 
theme, focus , and corporate purpose. 
Gordon Gekko and hi s apostles are wrong. Greed is 
not good for America . Greed, unchecked and unbalanced, 
harms workers, shareholders, consumers, and the public 
as Wall Street ' s endless fiduciary scandal s more than 
adequately demonstrate . In the ABC News documentary 
"Greed- Is It Necessarily Bad?" Atlanta billionaire Ted 
Turner observed "that a little greed is good for all 
Americans," explaining that sel £-interest is a good 
motivational interest in busi ness (ABC News, 2003) . But 
where ·s the demarcation between "a little" and 
"excessive" greed? A relevant Jesuit aphorism observes 
"everything in moderation , nothing in excess." 
If companies are going to engage in voluntary 
compliance, it is because peopl e at the top of the 
corporation are going to have a culture of integrity 
(Kleiner, 1997). The question becomes, then, "how do we 
create this "culture of integri ty?" Greed aside, the recent 
Hewlett-Packard ethics scandal involving senior 
executives reflects a culture of "anything goes." 
Determined to discover the ource of information leaks 
occurring among its board of directors, HP executives set 
up bogus email s, spied on joumalists using former FBf 
agents, and engaged in pretexting - in vesti ga tors 
requesting information from operators over the phone 
pretending to be someone e lse. Testi fy ing before a 
congressional investigation committee, fom1er HP 
chairman Patricia Dunn stated ''I be lieve these methods 
may be quite common," she sa id of pretexting, ''a t 
companies around the country" (Wa ll Street Journal, 
2006). [Based on Catherine Pratt- latest ethics scandal.] 
Does Teaching Ethics Work? 
There is empirical evidence demonstrating teaching 
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ethics has a positi ve effect in the workplace. One recent 
study involved accounting giant KPMG . Perhaps infected 
with some of the ethica l virus that caused Arthur 
Andersen to succumb, KPMG, one of the Big Four 
accounting firms , experienced its own significant 
emotional event when it remorsefull y entered into a 
settlement agreement on August 29, 2005, with the U.S . 
Department of Justice and Internal Revenue Service to 
pay fines totaling $456 million involving KPMG's sale of 
fraudul ent tax shelters (KPMG, 2005) . Perhaps reali zing 
something seemed wrong over time at KPMG in it s 
ethical climate, management conducted a Forensic 
Integrity Survey to determine: (I) How prevalent are 
incidents of fra ud or misconduct; (2) Have conditions 
that facilitate the prevention of, and response to fraud and 
mi sconduct changed since 2000 ; and (3) Are ethics and 
compliance programs having any effect (KPMG Forensic 
Integrity Survey, 2005)? 
The 2005-06 survey is based on over 4000 responses 
from KPMG employees nationwide. It states, "Our 
industry wide data del ves into perceptions regarding the 
preva lence, prevention, and detec tion of mi sconduct , as 
well as corporate reactions and tone at the top" (KPMG 
Cover Letter, 2006). There were three key findings: 
• Nearly three out of four empl oyees nationally - 74% -
- reported they had observed misconduct in 
companies where they were working in the prior 12-
month period, with half the employees reporting that 
what they had observed could cause "a significant 
loss of publi c trust if discovered ." These observations 
are virtua lly unchanged from employee observations 
in 2000. 
• Although the level of observed mi sconduct has 
remained constant, employee reported that the 
cond itions that faci li tate management' s ability to 
p1 event, detect, and respond to fra ud and misconduct 
improved since 2000. Some of those conditi ons 
involve (a) degree of pressure to do whatever it takes 
to meet targets; (b) lack of understanding of 
standards that app ly to their jobs; (c) belief that 
policies and procedures are easy to bypass; (d) belief 
that reward are based on re ults, not the mean s to 
achieve them: among others. 
• Employees who work 111 companie with 
comprehensive ethics and compliance programs 
reported more fa vorable results across the board than 
those employees who work without such programs. 
For instance, employees who work in compan ies wi th 
ethi cs programs reported fewer observations of 
misconduct and hi gher leve ls of confidence in 
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management 's commitment to integrity (KPMG 
Leadership Message 2006). 
Examining the findings 111 (3) more close ly, the 
Forensic Survey found: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Ethics and compliance programs have a favorab le 
impac t on reducing the preva lence of mi sconduct in 
organizations - observed mi sconduct in prior 12 
mon ths : 65% without program, 59% with program; 
observed vio la ti ons of organizational values and 
principles in prior 12 months: 55% witho ut program, 
43% with program. 
Ethics and compliance programs have a favorable 
impact on miti gating the cond itions that g ive ri se to 
misconduct - fee l pressure to do whatever it takes to 
meet targets : 60% witho ut program, 50% with ; 
believe rewards are based on results, not the means 
used to ach ieve them: 57% wi thout, 41 % with 
program; 
Ethics and compliance programs have a favorable 
impact on employee wi llin gness to report 
m isconduct- would feel comfortab le reporting 
mi sconduct to supervisor: 48% wi tho ut program, 
88% with program; feel comfortable reporting to 
interna l audit: 19% witho ut, 63% with program; 
comfortable reporting to board o f directors: 20% 
without, 59% with program. 
Ethics and compliance programs have a favo rab le 
impact on Employee percepti ons of the o utcomes o f 
reporting mi sconduct - be li eve appropriate action 
would be taken: 44% witho ut, 87% with progra m; 
be lieve they would be doing the ri ght thing: 65% 
witho ut, 92% with program. 
E thics and comp liance programs have a favo rab le 
impact of empl oyee perception s of the to ne at the 
top- believe CEO and other execs set ri ght tone on 
e thics and integrity: 29% without, 84% with 
program; believe CEO and other execs va lue ethi cs 
a nd integri ty over short-term bus iness goa ls: 28% 
w ithout, 82% with prOb,'Ta m (Weber, 2006). 
What Can We Teach T hat Matters In volving Ethics? 
Accoun ting, lega l environment , and business law 
facu lty sho uld teach the requi re ments o f the Sarbanes-
Oxley Ac t, and in parti cul ar Section 404. T hi s nrovis ion 
requires compani es and the ir a uditors to e va luate the 
effecti veness of the ir intern a l contTo l over fina nc ial 
reportin g based on a suita ble contTo l framework. In 
support of thi s, most companies in the U.S. are apply ing 
the integrated contro l framework developed by the 
Journal or Business and Leadership : Research, Practice, and Teachin g 
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) of the 
T readway Commi ss ion. COSO addresses ethics and 
compli ance program e lements in components that have a 
pervasive influence on corporate behavior. They indicate 
we sho uld be teaching: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
T he importance of establi shing the ethics tone by the 
board of directors and management 
Usefulness of establi shing codes of conduct and other 
policies regarding acceptable business practices 
The level at whi ch employees should be made aware 
of management' s expec tations 
How to address pressure to meet unreali stic or short-
term performance targets? 
How to address management ' s attempts to override 
estab li shed contTo ls? 
T he extent to wh ich ad herence to the code of conduct 
should be a crite rion in performance appraisal s 
How management sho uld be monitoring whether 
internal contro l systems are working? 
The importance of establishing channel s for people to 
repo1i suspected improprieties 
What ' sponses invo lving remedial action are 
appropriate when address ing violations of the 
company code o f conduct? 
If thi s is part of what bus iness fa cul ty today should be 
teaching abo ut ethics and comp li ance programs, what 
other methodology opportuniti es mi ght be useful for 
educationa l explo itati on? 
Recommendatio ns for an Ethics Revival 
T he fo ll owing is a list o f recommendations that if 
implemented , wo uld make academi a more responsive to 
the needs of the pub li c and investors : 
• Forn1ul ate and teach a Business Ethics course during 
the bus iness student 's first or second year (idea ll y in 
an lntTod ucti on to Business course) (Bus iness Week, 
.J an. 22, 2003) 
• Imbed ethics prob lems or ga mes such as Prisoners' 
Dil emma (thi s is a ty pe of non-zero -sum game in 
whi ch two players can "cooperate" with or "defect" 
(i .e. betray) the other p layer. The onl y concern of 
eac h indi vidua l player ("pri soner" ) is max imi zing 
hi s/her OW11 payo ff, w ithout any concem for the other 
player's payo ff) in each course taught in business 
schools; in clude ethi cs in ex it or proficiency exams 
(Business Week, Jan. 17, 2003) 
• O ffer ad va nced courses in business ethi cs that 
cha ll enge a student 's moral compass requ iring a 
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foundation with which to make difficult fiduciary 
decisions 
• Establish a student service-learning proj ect during the 
senior year in business school to integrate in a 
practical setting the knowledge, principles, and ethics 
of a four-year business curriculum teaching the 
aspirational service ethic, not the moral minimum of 
ever more profit (Weber, 2006) 
• Increase the number of symposia , lectureships, and 
similar programs, which give specific attention to 
ethics and value issues. These should offer "real 
world" scenarios- students understand the point 
better when they get to speak with and hear fro m 
individuals that have actually dealt wi th situations 
you discuss in class (Weber, 2006) 
• Increase professors ' awareness of their sign ificance 
as role models for students. If professors take ethics 
more seriously, then students will do the same 
• School of Business faculty should conduct annua ll y a 
continuing business education workshop to update 
themselves on the requirements of SOX (Sarbanes-
Oxley Act) and judic ial enforcement actions 
involving fid uciary obligations 
• Create a li st of "Guiding Principles" that illustrate 
how management can apply ethical standards of 
conduct, and defme " the way management works." 
These Guiding principles should contain principles 
such as uphold the law, create a culture o f open and 
honest communication, do the right thing, report 
results accurately, and build trust and credibili ty 
Not My Money 
We conclude where we began. While the Business 
Judgment Rule protects corporate offi cers and boards of 
directors in the exercise o f honest mi stakes and poor 
judgment that results in loss to shareholders, it does not 
provide total immuni ty. The protecti on is ava ilable only 
so long as the decision compli e with management' s 
fiduciary duties, acting in good faith , in what they 
consider the best interests of the corporation, and with the 
care that an ordinari ly prudent person in a simil ar 
position would exercise in like c ircumstances . "Thi s 
requires an informed dec ision with a rational basis, and 
with no conflict between the decision maker's personal 
interest and the interest of the corporation" (Cross, 2004). 
So Di sney shareho lders and M ickey want to kn ow 
how that ethically squares with the $ 140 milli on non-fault 
termination deal Mr. Eisner made and exec uted with Mr. 
Ovitz? Under the circumstances, would a reasonabl e 
Joumal o f Business and Leaders hip : Research, Practice, and Teachin g 
person - or even Pluto, conclude that the board of 
directors exercised "utmost good faith" in their fiduciary 
duties, acting with the care an ordinarily prudent person 
would in handling $ 140 million of Mickey 's and hi s 
fri ends' assets? 
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